


11 March, 2021



# Example of Providing Financial Support to Critical Infrastructure Services – Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 2010 - ongoing

- Event; September 4, 2010
  Magnitude 7.1 earthquake,
  epicenter 45km west of
  Christchurch central –
  considerable damage
- Event; February 22, 2011
  Magnitude 6.2, epicenter
  Christchurch most damaging
- > 10,000 recorded earthquakes



Canterbury Earthquakes 2010 +





### Christchurch City Damage

Residential

■ 100,000 homes damaged

■ 7,860 homes in red zone



#### **Central City**

• 70% commercial buildings

3000 businesses displaced

Cordon – 387ha





- 185 casualties from 20 countries
- 6,800 treated for injuries





- 52% road network (1000km)
- 31% sewer network (528km)



## Example of Providing Financial Support to Critical Infrastructure Services – Sewer Network

- 31% of sewer network damaged (528km)
- Owner of sewer network; Christchurch City Council (CCC)
- CCC carried insurance through a mutual funding arrangement across multiple local councils distributed throughout New Zealand – accumulated capital by annual contributions and supplemented by international reinsurance arrangements.
- September 2010 event exhausted all funds available through the mutual insurance scheme.
- By February 2011 event the extent of sewer damage had not been fully assessed.
- Following February 2011, due to extent of damage across road and water services, as well as common corridors, Government led establishment of a government/council/construction industry consortium "Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team" or "SCIRT" to:
  - Coordinate effort
  - Gain efficiencies, ensure quality
  - Minimize costs to taxpayer and others
  - Ensure councils continued to financially contribute within their capacity to do so

## Example of Providing Financial Support to Critical Infrastructure Services – Sewer Network

#### Learnings:

- Decision making in higher uncertainty (earthquake intensities expected to decline over time)
- Levels of insurance; book value (financial), replacement cost, replacement cost + (gross under-insurance)
- Multiple events; cascade or coincidental
- Duration of effects
- Damaged sewer system led to groundwater contamination led to contamination of potable water bores distributed throughout city
- Government financial mechanisms and capacity to apply funding (contingent liability)
- Insurance models (uninsured, self insured, partially insured, inability to secure insurance, multiple parties (mutual), national)
- Business impacts (MERIT Measuring the Economics of Resilient Infrastructure Tool)
- Extent of funded recovery; less than, same as or better than pre-event? Funding "additionality" relative to BAU?
- Community impacts ongoing disruptions
- Alternate means of delivering service

### **Conclusion / Takeaways / Recommendations**

- New Zealand continues to learn and improve
  - Has further strengthened emergency management to establish National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).
- Recommend national risk assessments across all hazards
  - Have greater focus on consequences rather than probability (e.g. New Zealand had exercised and prepared for pandemics, also biohazard incursion and many others).
- Assess consequences against a community wellbeing framework
  - As greatest impacts may not be physical damage e.g. pandemic.
- Reduction in demand is often overlooked
  - e.g. treatment plants, refineries, gravity sewer flows
- Ensure economic first, second and third order impacts are considered.
- Ensure financial capacity, capability and policy mechanisms to manage adverse events.
- New Zealand's experiences have been included in this new report on "Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services".
- Highly recommend report and adoption